




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What, after all, is leadership? ‘Leadership’ and plural action[☆]

E.D. Kort^{*}

Department of Philosophy and Religion, University of North Carolina, Wilmington, United States

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ABSTRACT

The question of what leadership is continues to be an important question to address, despite the many attempts to answer it and the suggestion that these many attempts are similar enough to recommend a standard definition of leadership. This paper addresses what is missed on the definition offered as standard by providing an analysis of ‘leadership’ and plural action.
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The posing and addressing of the question “what is leadership?” frames many contemporary discussions of leadership. Some scholars, however, have suggested that the question is superfluous; the continuing attempts to address it serve only to divert attention from more pertinent issues. Joanne Ciulla, for example, takes it that it is time that leadership studies move forward to focus on a new set of questions because the question about what leadership is has simply been answered.¹

Ciulla makes this point in the passage below and proceeds to urge a re-focusing of attention away from the question about what leadership is to examining differences among scholars about how the characteristic features of leadership should be demonstrated in groups or organizations:

Some contemporary scholars believe that if they could agree on a common definition of leadership, they would be better able to understand it.... After reviewing all of [Joseph Rost's] definitions, we discover that the definition problem was not really about definitions per se. All 221 definitions say basically the same thing—leadership is about one person getting other people to do something. Where the definitions differ is in how leaders motivate their followers and who has a say in the goals of the group or organization. (2002, p. 340).

Here, Ciulla is speaking of Joseph Rost's compilation of 221 definitions of leadership formulated during the 1920's and the 1990's. As Ciulla sees it, while it may seem that there is wide disagreement about what leadership is, given that there are so many definitions available, the differences between them are only apparent. They are actually saying the same thing about what leadership is and even what its characteristic features are. Leadership is about one person (the leader) getting other people (the followers) to do something. The definitions differ only in the particulars about the roles of leaders in practical settings. Ciulla proceeds to say that it is these points of difference that should supplant the more basic question of what leadership is and what its characteristic features are.

Some scholars, such as Archie Carroll and John Washbush, agree with Ciulla that the question of what leadership is is superfluous and discussions focusing on the question are off track of the main concerns in the areas of relevant inquiry. However, in their reasons for holding this position, they differ markedly from Ciulla. Rather than taking the task of identifying what leadership

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^{*} Department of Philosophy and Religion, University of North Carolina, Wilmington, Bear Hall 266, campus box 5601, 601 S. College Road, Wilmington, NC 28403, United States. Tel.: +1 910 962 7366.

E-mail address: Korte@uncw.edu.

¹ Ciulla, J. B. (2002). Trust and the future of leadership. In N. E. Bowie (Ed.), *The Blackwell guide to business ethics* (pp. 334–351). Oxford: Blackwell.

is and what its characteristic features are as simply completed, Washbush and Carroll contend that the task of defining leadership is misconceived because there simply is no such thing as leadership.² In Washbush's words,

[i]n the end...I believe that we are mostly left with endless discussions and perspectives of a word that simply sounds better (and certainly is more glamorous, and heroic) than management.... We seem to remain intent on calling almost everything leadership—but, as I mentioned...if everything is leadership, then logically nothing is leadership.³ (2005, p. 1084)

Here, Washbush asserts what Carroll also affirms—that there is no such thing as leadership because 'leadership' is the same as 'management'.⁴ Discussions of leadership serve and have only served to detract from the important issues about management that should be the focus of inquiry. In this way, they take it, as Ciulla does, that discussions about what leadership is and what its characteristic features are are both unnecessary and stand in the way of scholarly progress.

I take these two positions—represented on the one hand by Ciulla and on the other by Carroll and Washbush—to present a puzzle. The outcome of the positions is the same. The question of what leadership is is superfluous and continued attempts to answer it actually impede the progress of scholarship in related areas. However, the reasons behind the taking of this position stand in stark contrast. On the first view, the question about what leadership is has simply been satisfactorily answered. On the second view, the question has not been answered and can have no answer. The question itself has no meaning apart from considerations of management, since 'leadership' is the same as 'management'.

In this paper, I provide an analysis of leadership one of the outcomes of which is to address this puzzle of how it could be that there are these two such starkly different assessments of the question "what is leadership?" that are in agreement about the status of the question itself. The position I develop is aimed to provide a refinement to the standard definition of leadership that Ciulla takes to be articulated by the items on Rost's list. I explain how, once the standard definition is refined, it becomes clear how the position that there is no such thing as leadership squares with it in a way that is not available on the standard definition as it stands. My analysis will also provide a means for examining the features that Ciulla takes to be central to the concept and also confirmed by Rost's 221 definitions. Let us begin by taking a closer look at what the standard view of leadership is, what Ciulla identifies as being central to the concept 'leadership', and why a refinement is called for.

1. The standard view and calls for refinement

In this section, I will set the stage for developing a refinement of the standard definition of leadership by providing a more formal account of it. I will then explain in what ways it is lacking.

Let us begin by turning back to Ciulla's discussion of the standard view, for she provides some further explanation for what she takes the standard definition to be asserting about what leadership is and what its characteristic features are. Ciulla proceeds in the discussion containing the excerpted passage quoted above by providing a more complete account of what Rost's 221 definitions have in common. She states, "Leadership is the ability to impress the will of the leader on those led and induce obedience, respect, loyalty, and cooperation," and "Leadership is an influence relationship between leaders and followers who intend real changes that reflect their mutual purposes" (ibid).⁵ Taking these points with those listed in the introduction, we can state the standard definition a bit more formally in the following way, where Λ is a leadership relationship, A is an individual, M is a plural term for members of a group, Γ is a group (loosely or in a way more structured, as in an organization), and Φ is an action performed by an individual or individuals:

A stands in a Λ to M when

- (1) A and M are members of Γ ;
- (2) A is a leader of M , and M is A 's followers who intend real changes and reflect their mutual purposes;
- (3) A has power (potential influence) or influence over M ;
- (4) A 's having of influence over M consists of the impressing of A 's will on M and inducing M to obey, respect, be loyal to, and cooperate with A where
 - (i) 'Impressing A 's will' refers to M 's doing of Φ because A wants and bids that M do Φ ;
 - (ii) 'Respect' and 'being loyal to' refer to attitudes M may have toward A in Φ -ing;
 - (iii) 'Obey' and 'cooperate' refer to the degree of M 's compliance and consistency in Φ -ing.

1.1. A first call for refinement: the problem of circularity

As we have seen in the excerpted passages above, in articulating the standard definition of leadership, Ciulla states that leadership is an influence relationship between leaders and followers. She also states that leadership is about one person getting other people to do something and proceeds to identify the one person and the other people as "leader" and "followers".

² See Carroll, A. B. (2005). Ethics and leadership. In L. E. Pelton and S. L. True (Eds.), *Business ethics: Perspectives on corporate responsibility* (pp. 91–101). New York, Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

³ Washbush, J. B. (2005). There is no such thing as leadership, revisited. *Management Decision*, 43 (7, 8), 1078–1085. In taking this position, he draws support from Yoos, C. J. (1984). There is no such thing as leadership! *Proceedings of the Ninth Symposium: Psychology in the Department of Defense*, 343–347.

⁴ I use single quotes generally when discussing the concept.

⁵ Ciulla, J. B. (2002).

I do not take it that this way of presenting the standard view has occurred by a slip of the pen but, rather, that the standard definition of leadership, insofar as it assumes that leadership is a relation shared by leaders and followers, calls on a prior conception for what it is for someone to be a leader or a follower.⁶ It is for this reason and not by Ciulla's specific formulation that this point is reflected in the more formal presentation of the standard definition provided above (in [2]). But in relying on a prior conception of what it is for someone to be a leader or a follower, the standard definition admits of circularity. It is important to see clearly how this is so.

To begin, let us remind ourselves that circularity occurs when the definiens—what defines—is not clearly distinct from the definiendum—what is being defined—or when the definiendum occurs in the definiens. The following example sentences are provided by Patrick Hurley to demonstrate kinds of circular definitions that are relevant to our purposes of evaluating the current standard definition of leadership.⁷

Hurley's first example is meant to demonstrate circularity that arises when the definiens in one case is the definiendum in the other and vice versa. We can see how this occurs by the conjunction of the following two sentences:

- (1) "Science" means the activity engaged in by scientists.
- (2) "Scientist" means anyone who engages in science. (2008, p. 108)

Applying the same form to the standard definition of leadership, we see how the problem occurs:

- (1) "Leadership" means a relationship between leaders and followers.
- (2) "Leaders" and "followers" mean anyone who is in a leadership relation.

While the most obvious cases of circularity, such as instanced in the sentences above, occur when the term itself or part of the term used to identify the definiendum occurs in the definiens, circularity can also arise in operational definitions in which the definiens requires prior comprehension or conception of the definiendum. Hurley's example for such a case is, "Time" means whatever is measured by a clock." As Hurley puts it, "Surely a person would have to know what 'time' means before he or she could understand the purpose of a clock" (2008, p. 108). This second way in which a definition could admit of circularity indicates further that the problem of circularity as it arises on the standard view cannot be solved simply by re-wording or tweaking the definition. That is, if, in the definition, 'leader' just means one who stands in a leadership relation, then the definition is straightforwardly circular. To avoid this, we must read the definition as appealing to some prior conception of a leader. But since no such prior conception has been spelled out for us,⁸ it is not at all clear that there is a characterization of a leader in a sense adequate for use in the definition that does not appeal to the notion of leadership.

1.2. A second call for refinement and a second puzzle: the characteristic features of leadership

In her discussion of the standard view of leadership, Ciulla takes it that not only is the definition of leadership settled, evidenced by the basic similarities between the items on Rost's list, but that the characteristic features of leadership are likewise simply determined and agreed-upon. Let us examine this point more closely and, as we do, we shall see that we are presented with a second puzzle.

In the excerpted passages above, Ciulla states that leadership is "an influence relationship between leaders and followers who intend real changes that reflect their mutual purposes" and that leadership is "about one person getting others to do things." Others endorse what Ciulla asserts here and in the definitions she quotes above that leadership relations are relations of influence, which they take to be closely connected to power. For example, Gary Yukl states, "The essence of leadership is influence" (2002, p. 141) and takes influence to occur by the use of different kinds of power. He takes power to be the having of a potential for influence; in his words, "Power involves the capacity of one party...to influence another party" (2002, p. 142).⁹ As we have seen above, the standard view assumes that leadership is a relation between leaders and followers. Here we see that both Ciulla and Yukl take it that one of the characteristic features of that relation is the having of power or influence of a leader over followers.

A second feature of leadership that Ciulla identifies is ethicality. She claims that Rost's identification of differences between the definitions is really an identification of differences in the normative commitments that underlie them, and she proceeds to suggest that the normative commitments are moral commitments. In Ciulla's words,¹⁰

...how leaders get people to do things...and how what is to be done is decided...have normative implications. So perhaps what Rost is really talking about is not definitions, but theories about how people lead (or how people should lead) and the

⁶ An anonymous reviewer has suggested that there may be "structural" leaders holding leadership positions, for example, in organizations. If we take the "leader" in the quoted passages to refer to a structural leader in this way, the circularity may be avoided on the definition as it stands. However, a similar problem emerges on this repair, as the person holding the (structural) leadership position is a leader and a leader is just someone holding the leadership position. In either case, the definition employs 'leader' or 'leadership' implicitly or explicitly rather than stating what leadership is on independent grounds. I suggest that the problem in both cases arises from beginning with leadership relations rather than with the actions that underlie them.

⁷ Hurley, P. J. (2008). *A concise introduction to logic*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thompson.

⁸ It could be that some who accept the standard view as it stands accept a prior commitment implicitly and in the way I suggest. This is why I explain that my position is to refine the standard view, not to reject it.

⁹ Yukl, G. (2002). *Leadership in organizations*. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. See also Johnson, C. E. (2001). *Meeting the ethical challenges of leadership: Casting light or shadow*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. Johnson states, "leadership is the exercise of influence in a group context" (2001, p. 6) and, further, "[p]ower is the foundation for influence attempts" (2001, p. 10).

¹⁰ Ciulla, J. (1998). *Ethics, the heart of leadership*. Westport CT: Quorum Books.

relationship of leaders and those that are led. His critique of particular definitions is really a critique of the way they do or don't describe the underlying moral commitments of the leader–follower relationship. (1998, p. 12)

Based on her assertion that the definitions on Rost's list have normative implications specifically concerning the moral commitments of the leader–follower relationship, Ciulla proceeds to claim that “ethics lies at the heart of leadership studies” (1998, p. 18) and urges that “Researchers in the field need to get clear on the ethical elements of leadership in order to be clear on what the term leadership connotes” (ibid).

From these points, it seems clear that Ciulla takes it that there is an important ethical component to leadership that has not been fully recognized and addressed among scholars of leadership. When we look back at the standard definition, we do see some ethical terms such as “respect”, “being loyal to”, and “cooperate”, but they are not as central to the definition as we might expect them to be given Ciulla's statement that researchers should be clear on the ethical elements in order to be clear on what “leadership” connotes. That is, the definition as it stands does not seem to identify ethical elements of leadership that would be important for understanding the connotations of leadership. I see no reason to suspect a flaw in Ciulla's contention that leadership is importantly connected to ethics, but it may be that the standard definition as articulated above is not adequate to accommodate it.

Now, there is also a puzzle that arises on the claim that, on the one hand, a characteristic feature of leadership is power and, on the other, that the leadership relation has underlying moral commitments and leadership has ethical elements. The puzzle connects with what Ciulla calls “the Hitler problem” that arises in the following way. Ciulla identifies an outcome of an application of the standard definition in evaluating cases of leadership—what is required for one to be a “good” leader. As we have discussed above, the standard view connects leadership importantly to the having of power by a leader over followers. While Ciulla wants to claim that ethics is important for leadership, the result of accepting the standard view is that ethicality of leadership is posited as derivative on or secondary to the having of power. The ethics of leadership, then, is focused on such concerns as how one acquires and uses power. The acquiring or using of power is not available for ethical evaluation but taken as given and determines the range of ethical consideration. In Ciulla's words,

Power is one factor that makes the study of ethics and leadership different from other areas of applied ethics. One might even say that the ethics of a leader largely depends on how he or she gets, distributes, and exercises power and influence. (2003, p. 1)

But determining whether the way one gets and uses one's power and influence is ethical or not ethical is complicated in practical contexts, and Ciulla recognizes this. As she explains it, practical contexts with objectives emphasizing efficiency highlight an ambiguity in the term “good”. Getting people to do things is “good” in meeting practical goals. Our second puzzle arises because, if the meeting of goals appropriate to those contexts by the use of power is generally accepted as good, it does not seem to follow from the standard definition that a leader, in using power to meet collective ends, is bound or limited by considerations of ethics. As Ciulla admits, it is compatible with her view that many “good” or even “great” leaders are so because they are outstanding in their practical effectiveness—in having groups over which they have had power complete tasks or reach goals. But they have proceeded to do so in ways that are reprehensible from the standpoint of ethics or by working toward goals that are similarly objectionable.¹¹

In light of her claim that there are ethical elements to leadership, Ciulla's accession to allow that figures such as Hitler are leaders, much less good or great leaders seems quite odd. While Ciulla explains this outcome as arising from an ambiguity in ‘good’, I will suggest that the problem is a deeper one that arises on the assumption that leadership is a relation between leaders and followers. Our second puzzle is thus presented. We will aim to determine what it is about the standard definition that would prompt the acceptance of two incompatible claims—the first claim being that power is the characteristic feature of leadership and the second claim being Ciulla's suggestion that leadership consists of ethical elements.

Let us now turn to developing a refinement of the standard definition. In doing so, we should note that it is important to eliminate the circularity admitted by the standard definition as it stands. We shall do this by taking a point of examination that is analytically prior to and assumed on the standard view. As we shall see, our re-orientation to a prior point of analysis will also serve to dissolve the puzzles identified above.

2. The analytic priority of plural actions to leadership relations and some preliminary distinctions

We need a means of proceeding from describing characteristics of the relation between leaders and followers to examining the analytically prior assumptions about how that relation is established—for otherwise, we begin at the wrong end, calling on what we are attempting to define. It is tempting to make this mistake because, like many of our concepts, our concept of leadership is more nuanced than the articulated definition indicates. It is easy to miss the nuance because the language we use in discussing

¹¹ John McCall also discusses this problem. As he puts it, “[a]fter all, Alexander the Great was, by definition, a great, that is, effective leader. Yet he was known for the intense brutality that he inflicted on some conquered populations” (p. 133). See McCall, J. (2002). Leadership and ethics: Corporate accountability to whom, for what and by what means? *Journal of Business Ethics*, 38, 133–39.

leadership is coarser than the way we think about leadership. To better identify this difference, we may employ a standard philosophical procedure. Before following this procedure, let us say a bit about what it is.

2.1. Methodology

Since concepts are abstract and the objects or events falling under them concrete, the identification of a concept is not always simple. We do not know concepts by empirical observation of concrete objects or events but by considering the ways that we think about them. To determine how we think about them, to some degree, we can appeal to language. However, while language is a kind of intermediary between abstract concepts and concrete objects or events, words do not match perfectly at either level. Most often, as in our current analysis of leadership, our language about objects or events does not match the specificity of our concepts. Further, we cannot simply appeal to common definitions; while knowing a common definition of a word tells us how the word is usually used, when we want to grasp a concept we want to understand the thoughts behind what guides the use of the word based on ordinary conceptions.¹²

While identifying a concept may appear to be difficult given these complexities, there is a standard philosophical method to test the application conditions for concepts by positing a number of thought experiments or cases to see how we make judgments about the application of the concept to the objects or events highlighted on the cases. We can examine our judgments in this way by considering attributions that we would make according to everyday experience, our basic intuitions, and the subsequent ordinary use of language. For example, if we were to attempt to identify the concept 'roundness', we may consider a donut as a test case and ask ourselves whether or not we would ordinarily think of it as being round or say that it is round in considering it as such. In Frank Jackson's words,¹³

...my intuitions about possible cases reveal my theory...they could hardly be supposed to reveal someone else's! Likewise, your intuitions reveal your theory. To the extent that our intuitions coincide, they reveal our shared theory. To the extent that our intuitions coincide with those of the folk, they reveal the folk theory. Thus the general coincidence in intuitive responses...reveals something about the folk theory...in the sense of revealing what governs folk ascriptions.... (1998, p. 32)

Now we may respond differently to a case; our intuitions about certain test cases may vary. It is also possible to make errors or disagree about how we make judgments or what the outcomes of our intuitions about cases are. To minimize errors and to test what is driving differences in application, the procedure includes the positing of parallel cases or variations of cases to further test the judgments or intuitions. In this process, the features of the objects or events under consideration that are relevant to the application of the concept are brought into relief—some features of the objects or events under consideration are held constant while others are varied. The objective of the procedure is to isolate what emerges as the relevant set of features for the application of the concept. If we do so—if we can identify the relevant set of features that always accounts for the application of the concept and the concept does not apply in all instances failing to display the relevant set—then we have identified conditions that are both necessary and sufficient for the application of the concept. We have provided an analytical definition.

In following this procedure, then, I consider how we would ordinarily make judgments about and then talk about leadership across a series of specific cases or contexts. While it is not possible here to provide a complete range of test cases, my primary aim is to demonstrate that our intuitions about how leadership occurs are different from what the standard definition assumes. More specifically, I show that we think of leadership more as having to do with kinds of group actions and differences in how individual members of groups are involved in group actions than as concerning established relations in which someone is a leader and others are followers. I also hope to be able to provide enough cases to identify a more adequate definition of leadership than offered by the standard view and, thereby, to isolate cases of leadership "proper". 'Proper' here is in the sense of 'strictly speaking'. I do not mean to indicate that other leadership attributions are improper—somehow inappropriate or wrong. I only mean that "leadership in the proper sense" is leadership understood as at the core of the concept, recognizing that there are also many other useful but looser senses of leadership—similarly to a difference between a donut's being round (loose sense) and a perfect circle's being round (proper or strict sense).

I shall proceed first by offering three clarificatory points about leadership that emerge when we consult our ordinary ways of thinking and then speaking about leadership in particular contexts—for I take it that there are three main points at which the language we use in discussing leadership masks important distinctions, distinctions that, subsequently, are not adequately accounted for on the standard definition of leadership. This will set the stage for examining our ordinary intuitions about applications of the concept 'leadership' across a number of example cases in the sections below.

2.1.1. Revealing distinctions masked by the language used in discussing leadership

In this section, I identify three points at which the language commonly used in talking about leadership tends to obscure distinctions that are then not taken into account by the standard definition of leadership provided above.

¹² See Ludwig, K. (2007). The epistemology of thought experiments: First person versus third person approaches. *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, 31, 128–159. In this overview of the method, I also include points and examples from Ludwig, K. (2002). *Methodology and conceptual analysis*. University of Florida. Photocopy, and A framework for philosophical analysis. University of Florida. Photocopy.

¹³ See Jackson, F. (1998). *From metaphysics to ethics: A defense of conceptual analysis*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

2.1.2. Distinguishing things, actions, and relations

The first thing to note is that the relation assumed to hold between leaders and followers on the standard definition is a social relation, and social relations rely on actions of agents. In inquiring into a particular social relation such as that between leader and follower, then, it is important to investigate the actions upon which the relation finally depends. Doing so for the case of leadership will not only be helpful in evaluating the assumption that leadership presupposes that there be a leader and a follower but also in providing a check on a general temptation to treat relations such as the leadership relation as things or objects—ready tools to be used in the course of a group's doings rather than as established by the events in which the group is engaged. Let us begin, then, by distinguishing between these ways of thinking of relations.

While it may seem that there are obvious differences between objects, events, and relations, it is tempting to subsume the latter categories under the category of 'object' or 'thing'. This is, in part, because the surface structure of our language masks the differences between categories in the ordinary statements we make about instances of them. Consider, for example, the following statements: "the leaf was green," "the marriage was rocky," and "the parade was festive". These statements are of the same grammatical form and attribute a characteristic or feature to the leaf, the marriage, and, then, the parade. However, the leaf, the marriage, and the parade are quite different from one another in being different types of entities. 'The leaf' refers to an object, and 'the parade' refers to an event or process, i.e., a complex event or series of events.¹⁴ 'The marriage' refers to a relation between people and comes about by the occurrence of an event in which the people, the couple, participate—the event of a marriage ceremony and/or the signing of legal documents.¹⁵

Questions about leaders and followers that emerge from calling attention to these distinctions between categories are (1) what kind or kinds of events would result in a social relation in which some people are leaders and others followers? And, (2) which objects or people are involved in such events, and what is the nature of that involvement? To answer these questions, it will be helpful to take a closer look at events and actions before turning to our points of clarification to see how these distinctions connect to our understanding of 'leader', 'follower', and 'leadership'.

2.1.3. Distinguishing events and actions

As noted, leadership is a social relation, and social relations rely on a subcategory of events, namely, actions. Let us examine this point using some example cases to distinguish between events generally and actions more specifically.

Both a storm and a symphony performance are events, but a symphony performance differs from an event like a storm in that, while objects are merely caught up in the event of a storm, musicians participate in the performance of a symphony according to desires and beliefs of their own and in cooperation with others.^{16,17} This difference is made apparent in much of the language that we use to talk about storms and events like performances. Consider that the following example statements—"the storm was awesome"; "the performance was impressive"; and "the marathon was inspiring"—are the same in form, but they identify quite different sorts of events. Musicians in a performance play their parts, responding to cues from the conductor or others in their section in the course of doing so. Runners of a marathon assemble at the start, wait for the starter's signal, and proceed to compete with one another to win. But while these descriptions of what occurs in the events of a symphony performance and a race make sense, it would be strange to say of the winds and rains of a storm that they participated in, played, responded, assembled, waited, competed, or won. It is helpful, for our purposes, to examine these differences more closely.

First, as indicated by the examples of responding and competing, there is a similarity between the symphony performance and the race that the storm does not share. We can highlight this difference further by considering how we think about the causes and effects of storms and symphonies. In the case of a storm, many physical causes and effects may be identified that bring it about and result from it. There are winds and temperatures, the combinations of which result in the atmospheric conditions causing the storm. There are physical effects of the storm as well. Trees may be overturned or crops may be watered as effects of a storm's winds gusting or rains pelting.

It is also possible to identify the physical causes and effects of a symphony performance and a marathon. In the case of a symphony performance, there is a certain series of sounds produced by the playing of various instruments. There are physical movements resulting in the assembling of orchestral members on a stage, the giving of the conductor's cue, and the production of a combination of rhythms, timbres, volumes, and pitches. But in the case of the performance of a symphony, the description of the physical sequences alone seems inadequate. An adequate description of the performance must include the identification of the series of sounds as produced by actions of the participating orchestral members. The taking of a cue, for example, begins the performance. But the taking of a cue for a symphony performance, like the firing of the start gun for a race, requires a shared conceptual understanding between the members of the orchestra or participants in the race as to what they are doing. This is not, of course, possible for the component winds and rains caught up in a storm.

¹⁴ This claim is not agreed-upon by all. The distinction between these categories is a source of long-standing discussion. I make a simple distinction here between things or objects that persist through time and change in place and events that occur at particular times and places. Proper names may further obscure these distinctions. For example, while "Frank" names a person or object, "The Thanksgiving Parade" names not a thing or single event but, rather, a series of events.

¹⁵ Events are not the same as facts or states of affairs. This is in disagreement with Chisholm's position. See Chisholm, R. (1976). *Person and object*. LaSalle, IL: Open Court.

¹⁶ See, for example, Peter van Inwagen's discussion of storms. van Inwagen, P. (1990). *Material beings*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. The events of the performances are unique from the work—the symphony itself, in important ways. For an in-depth discussion of symphony performances, see Wolterstorff, N. (1980). *Works and worlds of art*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

¹⁷ I discuss the difference between participating in, contributing to, and being caught up in events more fully below.

To put it yet another way, there is no relevant description of anyone's intentions that would be connected with the storm's coming about or is available for describing the storm.¹⁸ Even if a person is caught up in a tornado funnel, it is not typically because of any wish or intention that he or she has to be so. In contrast, there are descriptions identifying agents' intentions that are not only relevant to the causal series bringing about a performance or a race but are also important for an adequate account of the occurrence of this kind of event.

This difference in kind of description available for storms on the one hand and symphony performances or races on the other highlights a distinction between the general category of event and actions, which constitute a subcategory of it. In recognizing this distinction between events and actions, it seems apparent that a social relation distinguishing leaders and followers, insofar as it is connected to some event(s), would be connected to the subcategory of actions and would require a shared conceptual understanding and shared intentions in the performing of actions for its establishment. But first, another distinction.

2.1.4. Distinguishing kinds of action

In the course of a symphony performance, each and every member of the performing group must participate by having some similar intention to perform the symphony and to perform it in conjunction with the cooperative efforts of the other members of the orchestra. In this case, assuming appropriate skill on the part of the participants, the performance follows, as it were, as a matter of course, and it is not at all a matter of surprise or remark. We can see the thrust of this point by contrasting it to a case in which a symphony performance (or something at least sonically indistinguishable from one) was accomplished despite the fact that no one in the orchestra had the intention to perform. This would, of course, be a marvel.¹⁹ The participatory intentions are clearly central to our understanding of how these sorts of events come about, even though these differences are not revealed in our language. Here, since we are interested to identify these differences, let us begin by identifying an action performed by a group as a “plural” action and consider further that there may well be different kinds of plural actions.

In considering that there may be different kinds of plural actions, the degree and nature of participation by the individual members of the group performing the action is important to consider. What members think they are doing—what their intentions are with respect to the action is significant for the patterns of decision-making in the action's coming about, expectations for how the action occurs, and what the responsibilities are of the individuals participating in it. It is not only in considering what each participating member thinks that he or she is doing but what he or she thinks he or she is doing in relation to others. It is this consideration that establishes, in our example, that the members perform the symphony together as an ensemble; after all, performing a symphony with others is quite a different kind of act than either playing through one's part alone in the practice room or playing through one's part sitting on stage with the other orchestra members as each and every member does the same.

These important differences in how plural actions are performed are also not made apparent in the statements we make about actions, and it can be difficult to know what a speaker means to assert when there is little context provided for interpretation. “We worked on the passage from B to C for 2 hours,” for example, may be used to assert that in a rehearsal for the complete orchestra the orchestra worked together on the passage from B to C for 2 hours. However, it may also be that each and every orchestra member worked on the passage from B to C for 2 hours alone in his or her practice room. These two readings—one “collective” and one “distributive”—seem to indicate quite different kinds of plural action that are not revealed in the surface structure of statements such as, “we worked on the passage from B to C for 2 hours.”²⁰ The collective reading takes it that the statement identifies an action performed by a group each and all of which intended to work on the passage and to do so working in conjunction with the other members of the group. The distributive reading takes it that the statement identifies an action performed by members of a group each and all of which intend to work on the passage but do so individually with no intention of working together.²¹ We shall take up this distinction with some modifications below.

Based on this difference between the collective and distributive readings of the example statement, we can suggest a parallel distinction to make indicating the differences between the intentions of the actors with respect to their involvement in plural actions. On the collective reading, the members of the group intend to perform the action and intend to do so in conjunction with efforts of others. On the distributive reading, the members of the group intend to perform the action completed by the group simply by their individual efforts with no intention to work with others in the course of performing the action.

With these preliminary distinctions between kinds of plural actions and the ways that members of groups can be involved in them, let us turn to examine how we might employ them in providing an analysis of leadership.

3. Kinds of plural action and an identification of leadership proper

As we have seen in our discussion above, plural actions may differ according to the nature or patterns of individual involvement by the members of a group performing an action in ways not specified in our common language.²² This may well be why we use

¹⁸ See Kirk Ludwig's discussion of descriptions of actions. Below, I take the example of the unintentional performance of a symphony from a parallel case also discussed by Ludwig here and formulated originally by John Searle. See Ludwig, K. (2007). Foundations of social reality in collective intentional behavior. In S. L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), *Intentional acts and institutional facts: Essays on John Searle's social ontology*. Dordrecht: Springer. See also Ludwig, K. (2007). Collective intentional behavior. *Noûs*, 41(3), 355–393.

¹⁹ See footnote 18.

²⁰ Kirk Ludwig (2007) explains this distinction in helpful detail in “Collective Intentional Behavior”.

²¹ Ludwig provides a formal account of this difference in “Foundations”. His example is “we sang the national anthem.” See footnote 18.

²² This has led to positing that there are such things as group agents. David Copp takes this position in his account of ethically reprehensible states of affairs for which there is no individual who could have been responsible. See Copp, D. (2007). The collective moral autonomy thesis. *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 38(3), 369–388. Kirk Ludwig argues against this position. See Ludwig, K. (2007). The argument from normative autonomy for collective agents. *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 38(3), 410–427.

'leadership', 'leader', and 'follower' to cover several different kinds of cases that current interests may encourage us to distinguish. In this section, then, let us proceed by examining sample cases representing a variety of kinds of plural actions and, in doing so, seeing how the different kinds of plural action may connect with our intuitions about applying the concept 'leadership'.

In the course of our discussion, I will introduce some terminology for ease of discussing the different kinds of plural actions and their connections to leadership. The first pair of terms is "participate" and "contribute." Members of a group that intend to work with the others "participate" in the course of performing a plural action while members of a group performing the plural action that do not intend to work with the others only "contribute" to the plural action. The second pair is "joint" and "disjoint." "Disjoint" plural actions are plural actions in which at least some and maybe all members do not intend to work with the others—they only contribute—while some members may intend to work with the others—they participate. For a plural action to be "joint", all of the members of the group must intend to work together with the others in performing the plural action and so participate. These distinctions are based on the distinction made between "distributive" and "collective" readings of plural actions sentences provided above, but provide us with a way of distinguishing between cases in which there may be some members of a group performing a plural action that do not intend to work together with others and other members of the same group that do intend to work together with others.

3.1. *Disjoint plural actions and 'leadership' in the loose sense*

Disjoint plural actions are actions that are performed by groups, but none or only some of the members participate in the action, intending that they work together as a group and others only contribute. While some members may know that the action is afoot, there may be many other members who do not. Here, let us consider the example of polluting the environment and see what it indicates for our consideration of leadership and further refinements of the category of disjoint plural actions.²³

3.1.1. *Serial leadership in cases of disjoint plural actions that are unintentional*

3.1.1.1. *Example: "we have polluted the environment"*. Suppose that "we have polluted the environment" is uttered by a particular member of a society and the one making the utterance is, by 'we', referring to the members of society or group as a whole. The pronoun is used loosely here in referring to the group actually performing the action—more formally indicated by "we (generally)" below—because 'we' in our example statement does not refer to each and every person. The group actually performing the action is not strictly the same as the group constituting the society. 'We have polluted the environment' identifies a plural action that is unintentional—those that did contribute to the polluting of the environment did not intend to do so and so did not intend to be acting in conjunction with others in doing so. However, many of their individual actions contributing to the polluting, such as Mr. Smith's driving his Hummer, were intentional.

Now, we should pose the question of whether or not it would make sense to say that someone was a leader in polluting the environment. In this case, there is an established group performing the action, and it may make some sense to say that someone was a leading contributor to the polluting of the environment.²⁴ It is, however, unlikely that we would identify someone as a leader in polluting the environment. While this may seem a slight distinction, it is a significant one. We may make the first statement and, in doing so, indicate that someone simply made the most pollution. But it seems that the attribution of leadership here is not deliberate. This is just a shorthand way of saying that someone did more than others in the performing of the plural action and seems to overlap with attributions of leadership to those who make contributions to plural actions with beneficial rather than harmful outcomes. It seems that it may be for this reason that identifying someone or some subgroup as being a leader in our polluting of the environment seems odd upon consideration. It would be unusual to assert, for example, that Acme was a leader in our polluting the environment. This may appear to be because, as according to the standard definition, the social relation distinguishing leader from follower has not been established or no one has power or influence over others inducing respect and so on in the polluting of the environment. But, as we shall see further below, these factors are not required for an attribution of leadership, even in a loose sense. It seems that there are reasons unconnected to this explanation for reluctance in making a point to attribute leadership to someone who had done the most polluting, such as that pollution is damaging and harmful. That is, it may be that we are reluctant to attribute leadership to polluters because the plural action of polluting the environment is ethically suspect and likely wrong.²⁵

We can test this reason by taking a look at a parallel case in which the outcome is ethically neutral or positive. Consider the statement "we developed our technological sophistication significantly during the last two decades." In this case, 'we' also refers to the society, the group that performed the plural action. No one intended that the society perform the act and no one made efforts to perform the act together. However, in this case, we may indeed call the member making the first, largest, or best contribution a "leader" in the development of technological sophistication in a way that would be out of place in calling the member making the first or largest contribution of the group a "leader" in polluting the environment. Let us say that Acme made the first, largest, or best contribution to the development of technological sophistication. It seems to make fine sense to say, "Acme was a leader in the development of our technological sophistication" in talking about the performing of this action. This matches the way we speak about leaders in such contexts. The title of "leader" marks the positive contribution by Acme to the ethically neutral or positive

²³ Ludwig (2007) discusses this example in "Collective Intentional Behavior."

²⁴ Explained further below, however, it seems that even this attribution is not a convincing fit.

²⁵ The question of how plural actions are assessed with respect to their ethical status is an important subject for further study. The examples I use in this paper are meant to be standard and for purposes of discussion; however, I do not assume that their ethical status is finally transparent.

plural action attributed to the society as a whole, even though the action was not performed in conjunction with others and was performed unintentionally.

But we should note that this sense of 'lead' has nothing to do with the having of influence over others in the way that the standard definition of leadership assumes. Acme simply was first or did the most or the best at something such that the overall effect was achieved and despite the fact that neither Acme nor any others of the group performing the act intended it or convinced others to do so. Does the attribution of the label "leader" work here? The attribution of the label works, but seems to employ only a loose sense of 'leadership' in a way that we would associate with leadership occurring in the course of someone's winning a competition. The leader is someone who does the best, contributes the most, or in some other sense outdoes the contributions of others to the plural action as a result of his or her individual efforts. Let us consider this sense of being a leader 'serial leadership'.

It seems that it is not required for cases of serial leadership that there already be a leader and follower and that the leader has influence. Rather, an action, which is a disjoint plural action, is ethically neutral or positive and, as it is performed, the contributions to it vary across those performing it in a way that admits of an ordering along some dimension. The plural action need not be intentional, but one of those performing it contributes to the plural action before, more than, or better than the others. More concisely stated, letting Λ^s be the serial leader relation,

A stands in Λ^s to M, i.e., (serially) leads M and so is a serial leader when

- (1) A and M (generally) contribute to the plural action, Φ ;
- (2) A contributes before, more, or better to Φ than any other member of M;
- (3) Φ is ethically neutral or positive.

3.1.2. Leadership by influence in cases of disjoint plural actions that are intentional

3.1.2.1. Example: "we decreased our rates of smoking". In this second kind of disjoint plural action, members of a group are influenced to do something individually by exposure to something someone else does or says so that they make a contribution to the plural action. Since 'influence' holds an important position on the standard definition of leadership, it is helpful to consider what place it has in a case where there is a group with no identified leader or followers who yet are performing an action disjointly and some members of the group have influence over others. Such an act may count as intentional—though not strictly, since only many of the members, but not all, have the intention to perform the act. While the plural action is intentional, it is disjoint in that not all of the members of the group identify their individual actions in conjunction with the others as constituting members of a group working together. In the following case, most do not.

There may be a case in which the people living for more than nine months of each year in the Northern Hemisphere decreased their rates of smoking. One person in the Hemisphere says to another person living in the Hemisphere, "We decreased our rates of smoking."²⁶ We can assume that not every member of the group deliberately contributed to this outcome or even contributed at all. At least some members decreased or stopped their smoking because they knew that doing so was a group goal, and only a few members of the group intending to decrease rates of smoking participated, intending to work as a unit together in doing so.

In this case, unlike our first, there was "influence" on some members prompting a change in their individual actions—some with an aim of meeting the goal of the group and others for other reasons. But the influence has to be of a certain kind to be relevant to any sense of leadership. For example, some of the contributions by members of the group were made because they were influenced by the Marlboro Man's dying. However, we would not assume that the Marlboro Man, insofar as his dying influenced the members of the group, was a leader. We could also imagine that in one country in the Northern Hemisphere many people stopped smoking because the cost of cigarettes and cigars was very high, which resulted in a spate of holdups taking place as customers returned to their cars from buying cigarettes or cigars at convenience marts. Some members of the group may have been influenced by these actions performed by thieves, but the thieves would not thereby be considered leaders in the group's decreasing smoking.

Now, there may be a Cancer Society that launched an anti-smoking campaign. While there was adequate funding for a large-scale campaign during the planning stages, the funds were cut such that the campaign consisted, in the end, only of conducting some informational lectures and creating and distributing brochures describing the negative effects of smoking. While the Cancer Society lectures were few and ill-attended and the brochures were not widely distributed, the information they conveyed made a large impact on the few people who heard or read them. The negative health effects of smoking explained in Cancer Society lectures and brochures were discussed by these people with others who proceeded to have similar discussions with yet others, even though no one talked about the source of the information. In this way, the information was made known to the public by way of discussion in private conversations, and there was, as a result, a greater stigma associated with smoking, the smelling of smoke, and other signs of having smoked that resulted in high rates of quitting.

The information provided by the Society was worthy of endorsement and taken as valuable by the members of the group of people living in the Hemisphere and performing the plural action. The Cancer Society seems to have had a relevant influence, then, because the information offered by the Cancer Society was significant for the health, understanding, or general benefit by those living in the Hemisphere. In this case, it would make some sense to call the Cancer Society a leader in the plural action. It would make sense to say, after the fact, that, "the Cancer Society, in launching its anti-smoking campaign, led us in our decreasing our rates of smoking," or, "the Cancer Society was a leader in our decreasing our rates of smoking." These statements make sense for the case presumably because of the Cancer Society's influence and despite the fact that there is no apparent way that the Cancer

²⁶ Here, as in the case above, 'we' does not include each and every person.

Society had power over the people in the Northern Hemisphere. The influence occurred by way of lectures and brochures in the Cancer Society's making available important information that was recognized as such by those living in the Northern Hemisphere and who were prompted, accordingly, to a change in their attitudes and individual actions. But if it had turned out that the information was misleading, led to harms rather than benefits, or was, in some other way, ethically suspect rather than being ethically neutral or positive, the attribution of leadership would be inappropriate.²⁷ As the case stands, however, it does seem that the Cancer Society had the right kind of influence for leadership, though this does not seem to be a paradigm case of leadership since almost no one even knew what the original source of the information was. Let us consider it to be, then, a case of leadership in another loose sense.

To make this point general, I suggest that the endorsement by M of a course of action following A's worthy contribution and a positive or neutral ethical evaluation of the course and outcome of the action account for our attribution of leadership in the case. However, similarly to our attributing to the group the performing of the act even though each and every member did not contribute to it, not each and every member must endorse or even know about the suggestions of the Cancer Society to attribute leadership to the Society.²⁸

It is important to point out that it also seems that both A and M (generally speaking) endorse the action. We would not say that A led M in our decreasing our rates of smoking if it were the case that A had, even unbeknownst to M, taken up policies to encourage smoking during the course of the campaign. In this case we may say that A "led" M to believe that A was endorsing the campaign when A was not. In this case, 'led' would be used as shorthand to indicate that A actually misled or deceived M into thinking that A was endorsing the action when A was not. If the Cancer Society had launched an anti-smoking campaign seemingly to decrease our rates of smoking but was supporting legislation to encourage increases in smoking among young people, we would not say that the Cancer Society was a leader in our decreasing our rates of smoking, even if the Cancer society had the same influence described above on the members of the group.

If the means or objectives connected to the plural action actually being performed were bad from the standpoint of ethics, even if one or the other received endorsement, it similarly seems that the Cancer Society would no longer be considered to be a leader. We can highlight this point by considering a case of significant contribution that is ethically suspect. A cigarette manufacturer may use an ad campaign that is aimed toward young people and suggests that smoking is stylish and sophisticated. The campaign is successful. Young people take up smoking in droves, and many older people follow suit to the new fashion. The result is that many more people take up smoking the manufacturer's cigarettes and smoking in general. In this case, it looks like the suggestions made by the manufacturer through the ads were endorsed, but it would be wildly out of place to talk of the cigarette manufacturer as being a leader in our increasing our smoking.²⁹ These points support the following suggestions about influential leadership, denoted with ' Λ ':

A stands in Λ^i to M, i.e., A (influentially) leads M and so is an influential leader when

- (1) A and M (generally) contribute to a plural action, Φ ;
- (2) A and M (generally) intend the plural action, Φ ;
- (3) The intentions or contributions of M to Φ occur upon M's endorsement of something A does or says;
- (4) What M endorses of something A does or says A also endorses;
- (5) What M endorses of something A does or says is ethically neutral or positive;
- (6) Φ is ethically neutral or positive.

The two kinds of leadership discussed so far are varieties of leadership though not leadership proper or strictly speaking. While the plural actions underlying these relations differ from those underlying relations of leadership proper, they resemble leadership relations in significant ways, as we shall see below.

3.1.3. Disjoint plural actions that are intentional and coordinated

3.1.3.1. *"We built the house" and "we completed the markdowns"*. In the case of 'we built the house', the 'we' refers to all those who contributed to the building of the house, including, for example, plumbers, carpenters, electricians, and a contractor. The role of the contractor is to coordinate the tasks of the others, but it is the others who actually do the building. They do not work together in mutual cooperation in the course of building the house. Instead, they arrive on site according to the schedule prepared by the contractor and perform their particular tasks according to their specialties.

²⁷ I am not suggesting that there could be no errors at all for the attribution to work. But it would not be that the Cancer Society deliberately made available misleading information or made misleading information available to the public out of neglect or inattention. While there is a wide range of errors leaders can and do make, basic incompetence or negligence is not usually consistent with attributions of leadership. In cases where it does seem consistent, the goals or reasons for the plural action may be different than those apparent.

²⁸ The Cancer Society is, of course, also a group. The example indicates that it is not only individuals who are candidates for leadership; the contributions made by members of the Society would be made explicit on a complete analysis, which is beyond our purposes here.

²⁹ This would also explain why someone who launched a campaign, say, to save lives by providing organs for transplants harvested by killing homeless people would be no leader. Both the means and the ends of the plural action must be ethically neutral or positive for leadership to apply; in this case, the means would be ethically reprehensible. We apply "leader" conversationally for a wider range of cases, but this is because these cases, while resembling cases of leadership in some ways, are not cases of leadership as we see when we attend to them more carefully.

This is a complicated kind of case, and it is this kind of case that is commonly found in discussions of leadership in organizations. It is this kind of case that seems to be presupposed by the standard definition on the following background assumptions:

- (1) There is someone in a position of authority over certain others and who, thereby, is a leader;
- (2) the leader identified in (1) gives directions or orders, influencing the others insofar as the leader has adequate power to make or encourage the others to act according to the leader's directions or orders.

These background assumptions made on the standard view are not supportable on the current account, which posits that becoming a leader even in the loose senses described above has to do with the nature and structure of decision-making, intentions, and contributions by individuals or subgroups in the performing of plural actions. Against (1), on the current account, plural actions are not leadership actions or instances of leadership because leaders perform them. Quite the reverse: leaders are such by way of the kinds of contributions that they make to the performing of plural actions. “Leader”, then, when used in ways that prompt one to accept (1) is only being used to indicate that in holding a position of authority, one is a purported leader. One is well-placed or has responsibilities to contribute to plural actions in ways that leaders do. Against (2), also indicated by our discussion above, directing or ordering others to do things with adequate power to back one is not adequate for the having of influence relevant for leadership. One has relevant influence when one endorses one's own suggestions that are worthy of endorsement and that are recognized as worthy and so endorsed and acted on by others. To be significant for establishing a case of leadership, the influence occurs in the course of the performing certain kinds of plural actions, and may well occur in the absence of power.

To see more fully what is required for the right sort of influence to occur and why power is not the same as having a potential for having influence, let us consider a case in which some have absolute power over others. Prisoners of war or slaves, for example, may be faced with the options of experiencing pain, torture, or death or doing what they are told to do by those in positions of authority—their captors or owners. In such cases, as is usual in cases of coercion, the slaves or prisoners have no genuine option before them to make—presumably it would be irrational to choose the torture or death over any option not resulting in one's mental or physical destruction.

If a group of prisoners of war or slaves are ordered by their captor or owner to build a house and to do so in a certain way, the prisoners or slaves will do so because those who hold these positions have power over them. However, we neither say that they are, then, “influenced” to do so in the way a leader influences followers nor correspondingly that their captors or their owners are their leaders. Their intentions to perform the action are not a result of endorsing the directions but a result of fearing significant harms if they do not. Their owners and captors have power, but it would be quite odd to say that slaves and prisoners are influenced by them to do what they are told to do. This is because, like the awkwardness of saying that one influences or leads one's car to start by turning the key, saying that one influences or leads prisoners or slaves attributes to them a rational endorsement of the command to contribute to the plural action that cannot occur. In both cases, what is done does not reflect an intention the source of which is an endorsement of the direction given. This indicates that these are not and cannot be cases of leadership. Let us return to our less extreme case that differs from this one in that those who are told to do something do it not so much to avoid torture or death but because they see it as their responsibility to comply or they have milder worries about consequences such as being fired, demoted, or reprimanded.

While there may be worries about being fired, demoted, or reprimanded looming in the background, it seems that the assumption that builders or employees follow the instructions of contractors or managers because managers or contractors hold power also appears to be at least occasionally false. If a member of a group is told what to do by a manager or contractor, it would seem that he or she complies most often because of an assumption that the plural actions performed by the group are facilitated practically by doing so. In the breakdown of tasks, one person contributes to a plural action by coordinating the others and the others accept the terms of coordination because the terms enable them better to make their contributions. In the building of a house under a contractor, the contractor determines the time and place for the plumbing to be done. The contractor tells the plumber what to do and when, and the plumber does what the contractor says because not doing so risks inefficiency—the plumber may arrive on the site before the carpentry work is finished and thus waste a trip.

A parallel case could be made for following the directions for price mark-downs in a department store. The employee does so as ordered by the manager to prevent glitches in the performing of plural actions by the larger group. A manager or a contractor thus makes a contribution of coordination in relaying orders for the contributions to the plural action in a way similar to how the rules of a game dictate what should happen when and by whom. The manager or contractor does have an important role to play in the performing of plural actions, and the others have obligations to follow what the manager or coordinator says that they should do when. Employees, then, or builders, do what they are told as a matter of course because, often through contractual arrangements, they accept or endorse the coordinating position of the contractor or the manager. They are, then, (1) not influenced by the contractor or the manager in a way that is essentially connected with the power held by the contractor or manager in having authority and (2) if they were to comply with orders by those in authority because of the power held by those in positions of authority, this would seem to make it less rather than more likely that those in the position of authority were acting as leaders, for as we have seen so far, it is worthy endorsement that is closely connected to leadership while power is more closely connected to coercion.³⁰

³⁰ The assumption that power is essentially connected to getting people to do things in ways relevant for leadership relations understood on the standard view is, perhaps, based on a false analogy with power in physical systems. To the degree that the standard view assumes such an analogy, it is fallacious, since power in physical systems and social relations differ in basic respects. The analogy not only fails but is dangerous to posit, even for purposes of discussion, as it encourages the treating of beings with minds as objects in physical systems with no capacity for thought, intention, or feeling—those very characteristics by which they are deserving of ethical consideration. See footnote 37.

In performing disjoint plural actions of the kind described above, the members of a group working under a manager or a contractor do not, on the face of it, work for a leader, although some managers or contractors may, for example, have influence external to their tasks of managing or coordination. This would be, however, a candidate case for leadership independent of the position held—the position held only making it more likely than not that they could or arguably should make more or better contributions or have influence on employees or builders relevant for leadership in the loose senses. So, while the contractor or manager may exercise serial or influential leadership, the contractor or manager does not do so by holding an office and having authority or by having employees or builders do what they tell them to do in their coordinating tasks.

We can see, then, how our first puzzle can be addressed, for it is the attribution of leadership to such cases of management that Washbush and others seemingly have in mind in positing that there really is no such thing as leadership. I have attempted to explain the grounds on which they seem to be exactly right in making this charge. Managers have important coordinating roles to play in the performing of disjoint plural actions, and so their contributions are of great value. However, the role of coordination is not sufficient for leadership. Managers need not act as leaders do, although they ought to be competent in coordination.

However, a manager may be a leader in the loose sense—that is, it may be that in taking a management position one is expected to act as leaders do by making the best or the most contribution to disjoint plural actions or making suggestions worthy of endorsement by others and so be a serial or influential leader. As Carroll sees it, this is just what is expected for proficient management. But since it is the case that one can perform the basic tasks of coordination without doing so in the way that would be requisite for one's being a leader, we may agree with Carroll that management positions are not leadership positions but resist the suggestion that 'management' is just the same as 'leadership'. Accepting a position of management may indicate that one will have tasks of coordination that one must fulfill competently. However in performing those tasks, one may also have obligations to act in the ways that leaders do to achieve excellence in management.

Let us simply substitute "management" to cover cases of coordination more generally:

A manages M when

- (1) A and M contribute to a plural action, Φ ;
- (2) A and M intend the plural action, Φ ;
- (3) M's contribution is coordinated by A;
- (4) A does not participate in Φ -ing;
- (5) M may participate in Φ -ing.

Now, in denying that cases in which there are formal positions of authority that are held by those who coordinate others are ipso facto cases of leadership even in a loose sense, we may briefly consider why it is that these positions are so often considered to be leadership positions. A first suggestion is that these positions developed into those prompting disjoint plural actions over time but were originally joint—at one time all the members participated in the action intending to work in cooperation with others. Organizations are now very large and the formal positions in them highly specialized. Disjoint plural actions are more efficient in many cases than the performing of joint plural actions would be. When organizations were smaller with less specialization, those who managed would have worked together cooperatively with others in performing plural actions. Plural actions that are now disjoint would have been routinely cooperative joint plural actions and, as such, more likely to be candidate cases for the establishment of leadership relations proper. These positions may still be considered to be leadership positions simply because the historically appropriate title of "leader" was retained while the positions changed so that they were no longer obviously candidate cases for leadership proper. "Leadership" and "leader" are terms of respect and esteem because leadership continues to be connected with the making of suggestions for how to carry out plural actions that are worthy of endorsement, making the best or the most contributions to plural actions, and contributing or participating in plural actions that are ethically neutral or positive. While the retaining of the title is appealing because of these positive associations, denying that those who coordinate are not necessarily leaders does not imply that these roles are not of central importance or value but only that the nature of the roles—the patterns of involvement in the plural actions—has changed.

A second reason why the title of "leader" may be attributed to those holding such positions of coordination even though they are not leaders in the proper sense is that it may be that those holding such positions of authority are chosen for those positions because they are serial or influential leaders in their areas—they are good at what they do and often respected, and their worthy suggestions may be endorsed and others influenced by them. But this making the most or best contribution or having of influence does not occur as any necessary part of the day-to-day workings of the group in cases of management. It is an enhancement to the position, which is not in itself a position of leadership, strictly speaking. Thus, it is more accurate to say that positions of coordination may dispose or obligate one to act in ways that are similar to the ways that leaders act or to become a leader in one of the loose senses identified above.

3.2. *Joint plural actions and leadership proper*

In contrast to disjoint plural actions in the performing of which there may be members of a group who do not participate or even contribute to the plural act, in joint plural actions all of the members contributing to the plural action intend to act together with the others in the group as the group performs the act. As discussed below, however, it is not necessary that the action performed by the group is an intentional action for it to be joint.

3.2.1. Joint plural action that is unintentional and cooperative

3.2.1.1. *Example: “we won the prize for having the best float in the parade”.* This first kind of joint plural action is distinguished from the others in that the action is unintentional. In this example case, a group performs the action of building a float for a parade on which they all ride in the course of the parade. All of the members participate in the plural action of the building of the float. Each member of the group is aware of working with the others—is actively engaged in the process of building the float, and intends to build the float together with the others. These features of the plural action are significant for its being joint rather than disjoint—for in cases when an action is disjoint, those contributing to the action do not all participate in the action, intending to work together.

In our case, while they all intend to enter their float in the parade, unbeknownst to the members of the group, their entering of the float in the parade also counts as an entry into a contest for the best float in the parade. Unanticipated by the members of the group, their float is chosen as the best float. They thus enter the float and proceed to win the prize, performing joint plural actions that are unintentional.³¹

Would it make sense to attribute leadership in such a case? It would seem out of place to do so. Consider the statements “Flora led us to victory” and “Flora was a leader in our winning the prize for the best float”. These statements seem odd. The attribution of leadership is odd because the whole group intended to be working together and to be performing an action together intentionally, but it was not the action of entering a contest and winning. Since they meant to work together and, in doing so, shared an intention to build a float, the attribution of leadership to the unintended action of winning the contest for the best float they performed in the course of their doings is erroneous. Only the actions that they all intend to perform as a group are candidates for the establishment of leadership in the proper sense.

The actions of entering the contest and winning the prize are not candidates for cases of leadership, but, since the members intended to work together, the looser attributions of serial or influential leadership do not seem to fit either. This is because, in recognizing that they are working together and doing so in completing the intended actions, the attributions of independent contributions for seriality or influence alone seem also out of place. It is because in disjoint plural actions at least some members of the group have no intention to work together with the group that they are candidates for cases of leadership in these looser senses. This indicates, then, that while they may share some characteristics, cases of leadership proper do not overlap neatly with cases demonstrating the looser senses of leadership—serial or influential leadership—that apply to disjoint plural actions. The looser senses of leadership generally apply only to cases in which plural actions are achieved by a sum of individual actions (where individual actions may be performed strictly by individuals or subgroups such as the Cancer Society) rather than cooperative efforts. This indicates, further, that while influence may be an important part of leadership proper it is the fact that the plural action is joint rather than disjoint that divides cases of leadership understood in the looser senses and candidate cases for leadership in the proper sense. As we have seen here, for leadership proper, the joint plural action must be intentional to count as a candidate; but if a joint plural action is intentional, must it also be cooperative? Let us consider another case.

3.2.2. Joint plural action that is intentional but not cooperative

3.2.2.1. *Example: “we ran the race”.* Let us consider the example of the running of a race, which is a joint plural action. All of the members of the group intend to run the race, abiding by the rules governing it and completing the determined course, and they intend to do so together. There is a beginning and end to the race, and the distinction between winners and losers is determined by the order of the participants crossing the finish line. Each person performs to his or her best, purportedly with an intention to engage in the group action of running the race by performing independently, competing with the other runners—relay races aside. The running of the race is thus joint and intentional, but it is not cooperative; the contributions are distributed over the individuals as they run as fast as they can with the hope that they will run faster than the others and so be first to cross the finish line.³²

Now, interestingly, here there will, most likely, be a case of serial leadership in the course of the race in that one member of the group will be ahead of the others at a certain time. We may say, “Ira is leading the pack after the first turn” or “Ira is the leader of the pack after the first turn,” but this application of serial leadership carves out differences in individual contribution as they compete, not as they join forces in running the race. The title of “leader” does not apply to the joint plural action of running the race; Ira leads the pack in competing with the others and making the best individual contribution, not in working together with the others. While the action performed by the group is joint, then, the case of serial leadership may apply because, at the level of competition, the action requires only individual rather than cooperative effort. Could such an action be a candidate for leadership proper? The running of the race serves to establish a social relation, but this is the relation of winner and loser, not leader and follower. This is because the members of the participating group do not work together cooperatively but, rather, compete against one another by their individual efforts.³³ While

³¹ An anonymous reviewer has pointed out that it may be that in building a float of high quality, one could be considered to build a “prize-winning float”. It seems, however, that building a float of high quality with no thought of contests or prize-winning is quite different from building a float with the intention of actually entering a contest or even building a float that would win a contest over other contestants were there to be a contest. The example could, however, be modified so that entering the float in the parade counted as entry for a raffle.

³² An anonymous reviewer has pointed out that there is some strategy such that some runners may run faster at certain points in evaluating their competition. However, this would not count as any cooperative effort.

³³ Those who set up the race or referee the race would not be leaders either. While they play important roles of coordination, they do not run the race. The coach, too, may contribute to the race by advising or motivating a runner but, similarly to the referee, would be a coordinator rather than a leader proper. Explained above, those holding such positions are often called leaders because the position may obligate them to act in ways similar to the ways leaders act. But also as we have seen above, this is not adequate for cases of leadership, strictly speaking.

this does not seem to be a candidate case for leadership proper, it serves to indicate that a case of leadership requires that there be something other than serial leadership—that the plural action be not only joint and intentional but also cooperative.

3.2.3. *Leadership proper: joint plural actions that are intentional and cooperative*

3.2.3.1. *Examples: “we performed a piece of chamber music” and “we built the raft”.* Joint plural actions that are intentional may be uncooperative in the course of their happenings, as in the example of racing above. In that case, the members of the group perform the action together, but they do not cooperate together in performing the action. In this section, we consider two kinds of case in which the joint plural action is intentional and the members of the group work in cooperation. These cases are candidates for leadership proper, and they provide examples of candidate cases of actions establishing leadership relations that arise by plan and candidate cases that arise spontaneously. Let us take these in turn.

The performing of a piece of chamber music by a chamber ensemble is a joint plural action that is both intentional and cooperative. In a performance, in contrast to a joint action like a race, it is the mutual, cooperative participation of the individual members throughout the course of the action that constitutes the performing of the piece. The concertmaster conducts and makes suggestions worthy of endorsement by the other members of the ensemble toward excellence of the performance, which is a goal they all share (generally speaking since, of course, some ensembles may have different goals). The concertmaster participates in the performance by playing his or her part as well as giving cues, signaling nuances of phrasing, rhythm, dynamics and so on as the performance takes place. The members of the ensemble respond to the concertmaster's signals accordingly. If the concertmaster sneezes so that his or her violin moves in a way resembling a cue, the members of the ensemble do not (usually) take this to be a signal. They respond to what they take the concertmaster's assessment to be of what is needed with regard to their contribution given the contributions of the other members at that time. The members of the ensemble also pay attention to what the other members are doing. They work cooperatively through musical communication with one another so as to achieve the desired nuances in melody, rhythm, and pitch. The concertmaster, it seems, in such a case, would be a leader.

Now it could be that someone holding the position of concertmaster in such a performance fails to lead. If we say, “the concertmaster led the ensemble's performance”, what we indicate is that, in general, the concertmaster was successful in making suggestions that were endorsed by the members of the ensemble so that they tailored their playing in response to the cues as they worked together, cooperating in their efforts through the course of the performance. However, someone who is concertmaster of such an ensemble can be a quite poor, let us say incompetent, conductor. Because of the concertmaster's formal “leadership” position, the participation by others is affected by what the concertmaster signals. Such signals may be regarded and followed because of a practical objective of getting through the performance, feelings of obligation, fears of being fired, and so on. But insofar as the concertmaster's suggestions are not worthy of endorsement by the members of the orchestra by consisting in errors, the incompetent concertmaster fails to lead, and there is often an unsuccessful flat performance at best. Now, very few, if any, concertmasters are perfect; the case is meant to highlight that competence is usually a requirement for leadership and that someone may be called a leader when they only hold a position of leadership but actually fail to lead. This case is the same as that indicated above in our discussion of management in that, as pointed out there, when we speak of someone holding a formal position that best situates them or obligates them to lead or to act as leaders do and call them “leaders”, we are not implying that they actually are leaders. It is only when the concertmaster does lead—participates in the plural action in (generally) the right sort of way—that the concertmaster is a leader in the sense proper.³⁴

In the case of a performance of a chamber ensemble, there is a member of the group traditionally expected to lead the others. However, in the event that this person fails to lead, the performance may still take place. It could be that the concertmaster undergoes a fit of coughing such that he or she must leave the stage. It may be, in that case, that the second chair steps in. In a way, this could be a case of spontaneous leadership. However, it is generally assumed that, should something happen to the concertmaster, the second chair has responsibilities to conduct and lead the ensemble. A more obvious case of spontaneous leadership would occur among a group in a real emergency.

Let us consider a case of spontaneous leadership proper prompted by rising floodwaters. There is a group of people each of whom thinks that he or she will be able to escape a flood by staying in an otherwise abandoned house at the top of a hill. However, the flood is worse than anticipated, and it is required that they build a raft to escape. In this case, the group performing the joint plural action is ad hoc, being thrown together by their common thought that the abandoned house would be a safe place and the necessity of the plural action prompted by the circumstance of rising waters. The group comes to a decision to build a raft, but they make no decision about who will lead, and there is no formal position of leadership available to dispose one member to do so. It turns out, however, that one person makes sound suggestions for how to cooperate and proceed in the course of the making of the raft and that the others endorse and so are influenced in their cooperative contributions in response to such suggestions. This person leads the others in performing the plural action and is thereby properly a leader.

In sum, it is cooperative intentional joint plural actions that are candidates for establishing leadership proper. In some cases, it is anticipated who will be the leader—as in the case of the performance of a piece by a chamber ensemble. In other cases, the leader may emerge spontaneously among those performing the plural action. In both cases, however, it is the nature of the participation

³⁴ There are, of course, many ways to measure success, and the goals of performance may differ across ensembles. Commonly, however, the aim of the musicians would be to perform the piece in ways respectful to the composer's intentions and with musical sensitivity. Even these goals, however, stated in this general way, are not agreed-upon by all and, insofar as they are agreed-upon, there are different assumptions about how best to reach them.

in the plural action that determines leadership. A leader is a person (or persons) who, in the course of an ethically neutral or positive cooperative intentional joint plural action or series of actions, makes good decisions and suggestions thereby worthy of endorsement that are endorsed by others and by which, therefore, they are influenced in their doings in the course of the action so that the action is performed (overall) successfully.³⁵ This relation, then, occurs by way of an event—the plural action. Those participating in the action endorse and so act upon the suggestions of the one who is thereby established in the course of the action as being the leader, having made sound suggestions and having participated cooperatively in the performing of the action. In sum, where Λ is the relation of leadership proper,

A stands in Λ to M, i.e., A leads M and so is a leader in the proper sense when

- (1) A and M participate in a plural action, Φ ;
- (2) A and M intend to perform Φ ;
- (3) A and M cooperate in performing Φ ;
- (4) A makes suggestions for proceeding either spontaneously or as a matter of course, which are worthy of endorsement in displaying general competence and being ethically neutral or positive;
- (5) A's suggestions are endorsed by A and M, acted upon by M, and thus influence M's contribution;
- (6) Φ is endorsed by A and M;
- (7) Φ is ethically neutral or positive.

4. Back to the standard view

4.1. Addressing the first puzzle

In our introduction, we introduced a first puzzle. The puzzle was how it is that there could be two very similar positions—on the one hand held by Ciulla and on the other held by Carroll and Washbush—taken about the status of the question “what is leadership?” that could differ so widely in their respective assessments of it.

Our analysis shows that when we make the kinds of plural action that are frequently performed in organizational settings explicit, we see that the claim that there is no such thing as leadership carries some weight. While they may once have been, positions of managing and coordinating generally are not positions in which one regularly participates in plural actions with those coordinated or managed—from our cases, builders or employees. Rather, it is more common to contribute to the performing of disjoint plural actions by coordinating the tasks of others. The holding of such a position, then, is not the holding of a position of leadership.

However, in distinguishing between the basic duties of coordination that one performs in such a position and excellence in performing those duties, it may be that the holder of such a position is expected to act in the ways that leaders do and so be a leader in one of the looser senses, since the plural actions are generally disjoint. Someone holding such a coordinating position, then, may be a purported leader. There may simply be expectations to proficiency that would require, for example, a contractor or a manager to act in the ways described above as being adequate for establishing leadership in one of the looser senses. While, then, we have seen that there is something to the position that there is no such thing as leadership as it applies to management positions, we may distinguish between managers who, in taking a management position act more as coordinators and those who act in ways that establish leadership in the looser senses. This difference may be important to maintain in light of a shift from managers' participation in plural actions to roles of managers prompting plural actions that are largely disjoint.

That management positions are positions of purported leadership matches also with the standard view and Ciulla's claim that what leadership is has simply been determined. This is because positions such as management positions are positions of authority and those taking them may regularly have obligations to act as leaders do. They are to use their authority and the power associated with it to make decisions with an aim toward practical effectiveness, but they may also be obligated to make the most or best contributions (serial leadership) or make suggestions that are worthy of endorsement (influential leadership) by others.

4.2. Addressing the second puzzle

Our second puzzle arose because the standard view posits power or influence as the characteristic feature of leadership but it is also thought that the concept of leadership is normative—more specifically that it has ethical elements. Discussed above, as a result of these two assumptions, there arises a problem—what Ciulla calls the “Hitler” problem.

As we have seen, it is false that power is a characteristic feature of leadership. By our series of cases, we have seen that power alone is not necessary for leadership, and it would be if it were indeed a characteristic feature. This is not to say that leaders cannot have power or influence. Leaders may have power, and they may have influence. But by our analysis, we see that the influence must be of a certain kind that is connected with integrity and competence. The use of power in anything of the way of brute force actually makes it less rather than more likely that one acts as leaders do.

Our puzzle arose because Ciulla allowed that power is a characteristic feature of leadership but also accepted that there are ethical elements to leadership, and this resulted in the Hitler problem. Ciulla's suggestion for meeting the Hitler problem is to

³⁵ Again, what is considered as successful will vary across contexts. It may even be that a specified goal is not met but that a mighty effort was made which counts as an adequate outcome.

encourage the development in ethical thinking of those holding leadership positions—to provide them with “expanded moral repertoires” that would enable them to solve problems by calling on a wider range of experience and so to be able to choose from a wider array of ethically acceptable options in making decisions that present complex ethical challenges. But this solution seems unconvincing once one’s practical objectives are in place. Even if one were to have more options from which to choose, making the further case that one ought to base one’s decisions on ethics at all in such contexts seems finally irrelevant to the tasks and basic objectives of leadership so understood.

While Ciulla wants to emphasize the centrality of ethics for leadership, the standard definition of leadership that she assumes does not lend itself to an account that can provide support for this claim. This is because ethical considerations are, in fact, external on this view to the concept of leadership. As we saw in our introductory sections, while the standard definition contains some ethical components, the components are minimal. What the definition basically states is that leadership is the having of influence understood finally as power. This allows that effective leadership and ethical considerations can come in conflict, so doing what is ethical can detract from being a good leader. Ethics may seem often enough incongruent with efficient means of meeting practical objectives if it requires placing checks on the uses of power or influence.

On our analysis, which our discussion shows to be more accurate than the standard view as it is articulated in our introductory section, the leadership relation is established by the occurrence of a certain kind of plural action in which the leader makes suggestions to others that are worthy of endorsement in being competent and ethically positive or neutral, the others endorse the suggestions and are thereby influenced by the would-be leader, and the plural action is ethically neutral or positive. In practical settings, while someone may hold a position of formal authority high in the structure of an organization—the kind of position which, discussed above, is taken in such contexts to be a “leadership” position—that person can fail to be a leader in several ways that do not have to do with the amount of power that the person has or how effective a person is in wielding power over others and getting them to do things.

Holding a position of authority in which one coordinates, manages, or makes decisions affecting others is only an indication that the person holding that position is expected to lead or act in the ways that leaders do. Such expectations and obligations entail, on our view, that there is no brute force or coercion over others, that, rather, both the means and ends of plural actions are agreed-upon, worthy of endorsement, endorsed by the members performing the action, and both means and ends are ethically neutral or positive. Thus, on the present analysis, the ethical component is internal to leadership. This matches and explains Ciulla’s emphasis on the importance of ethics for understanding leadership in a way that is not available on the standard definition. This internal connection is simply not available on the standard view because that view is orientated to relations, not actions. This makes the ethical elements unavailable because (1) it is actions that are the unit of ethical evaluation, not relations and (2) relations assume and are derivative on the actions that underlie or establish them.³⁶

The standard view of leadership introduces problems such as the Hitler problem because it is power that is thought to be central to the definition, and, since it is focused on relations, it is not available on the standard view to evaluate the actions performed—to examine how or why power is exercised in the performing of plural actions. As Ciulla points out, the definitions offered differ here, and this is just because how or why power is exercised is not essential or even available as a central part of the standard account. But, as demonstrated above, we do not even think of leadership as associated with power in the way offered as the standard account when we attend more closely. It seems that when we examine carefully this claim about the centrality of power for leadership, it seems misplaced. The use of power over others in getting them to do what one wants them to do matches more closely with the coercion, violence, and corruption of a bully than with the respectful engagement, beneficence, or promotion of well-being that we associate with leadership.³⁷ This is one reason why one cannot attribute to Hitler “goodness” or “greatness” in leadership without wincing at the attribution, wondering what has gone amiss in prompting one even to be tempted to consider Hitler a candidate for a great leader.³⁸ My analysis explains why this is so. When we consider the attribution of leadership greatness or simply of leadership in light of the plural actions performed rather than the holding and effective exercising of power over others in a “leadership” relation, we realize why we feel repulsed to think of Hitler as a great leader. Hitler used his power and influence in the pursuit of a project so heinous in its means and ends that it will cast a shadow over centuries after it occurred. Making the plural action explicit, we see how it is that Ciulla’s claim that leadership has ethical elements is exactly right—there seems something oxymoronic in saying, “Hitler was a leader of the German people in their killing of over six million innocents.”

4.3. *The problem of circularity, revisited*

To avoid the circularity committed by the standard definition as it stands, we resisted the assumption that someone taking a formal position of leadership is a leader and to recognize instead that someone taking such a position is only a purported leader. That is, the taking of a formal position of leadership indicates only that one is expected to act or has responsibilities to act in the ways that leaders do. In this way, while in actual cases one may hold a “leadership” position prior to being a leader it is in acting in ways appropriate to leadership that establishes that one is a leader, in either one of the loose or proper senses.

³⁶ This error occurs frequently in externalist approaches to analyses in these contexts—approaches that are effective, but, as Robert Solomon puts it, have “wrecked havoc on ethics” in general (2003, p. 43). See Solomon, R. C. (2003). Victims of circumstances? A defense of virtue ethics in business. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 13(1), 43–62.

³⁷ This point is emphasized in Lord and Brown’s discussion of the emotional and characteristics of followers. Lord, R. G. and Brown, D. J. (2004). *Leadership processes and follower self-identity*. Mahwah, NJ and London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.

³⁸ In our own day, we might consider a parallel case of a “leader” of a terrorist group. We may say, in conversation, that “(A) was a leader of the terrorists” in the way that we say “Hitler led the German people.” But when we focus on the acts of terror, we do not make the assertion. We do not say something to the effect of, “(A) was a leader to the young people on their suicide missions by which they killed thousands of innocents.”

This shift is not only a means of avoiding the circularity that arises on the standard definition but more accurately matches common conceptions of leadership and leadership relations. After all, there is the possibility and even common occurrence that one may (1) hold a position of leadership and (2) fail to lead, thus failing to be a leader. This possibility indicates that the holding of a position of “leadership”, thus having a relation of “leadership” with “followers” or subordinates, is not sufficient to count for a case of leadership proper. But holding a position of “leadership” is also not necessary for a case of leadership proper. As we have seen, while one may act as a leader in such a position, one may also become a leader spontaneously in cases where there is no formal position of leadership available at all, such as in the rising waters case.

5. Conclusion

In sum, it seems that a re-orientation from relations to actions provides the basis for a more accurate account of leadership than the standard definition can deliver. We have seen that such a re-orientation accounts for the wide range of cases that we consider to fall into the scope of appropriate applications of “leadership”, though some more strictly than others. It seems that this range and variety match with our intuitions about ways to be a leader.

The orientation to actions rather than relations also makes explicit the centrality of ethicality and competence associated with leadership and suggests a reason why it is that the title of “leader” is thought to be title of respect and esteem. It is, perhaps, because of the positive associations with the title that attributions of leadership are made in contexts that do not actually admit regularly of acts of leadership or the leadership relations resulting from them.

Finally, the standard definition of leadership assumes that leadership is a relation between leaders and followers. But we must determine what leadership is independently from claims about leaders and followers that arise on the assumption that leadership relations occur within formal hierarchical structures such as organizations. Organizations are structured according to positions and expectations for how individuals assuming those positions will or should act in relation to others holding other kinds of positions. While it does not seem to be problematic to consider these positions to be those of “leadership”, it should be kept in mind that they are because those holding them are purported leaders—they have obligations to act or there are expectations that they act in ways that leaders do.